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Proponents of circuit breakers justify the practice citing its utility in placating stressed markets,
persuading agents to reflect on available information, and to trade rationally. Opponents counter
by calling it an infringement on laissez-faire price discovery process citing the lack of conclusive
evidence of their effectiveness in market crises. After nearly three decades of theoretical and
empirical scrutiny, this discord persists. Most of the empirical focus in this domain revolves
around ex-post performance of circuit breakers in cooling off the market, interference in trading,
volatility splattering, and delayed assimilation of information. A less explored hypothesis is a
potential for traders to hasten trading plans fearing illiquidity or trading blockade. Thus, the
existence of the circuit breaker alone can induce its tripping. Known formally as the magnet effect,
this hypothesis remains less explored due–inter alia–to paucity of data and methodological limi-
tations. Greater availability of high-frequency datasets in recent times, however, has spurred a
growth in empirical works focusing purely on the magnet effect hypothesis. As this nascent sub-
discipline in market microstructure grows, this paper undertakes one of the first formal surveys
looking to consolidate theoretical and empirical works on magnet effect. Moreover, we discuss
methodological challenges and analytic limitations which strain the credibility of academic
research findings in this domain; particularly among regulators.1. Introduction
Circuit breaker, in financial market parlance, is an umbrella term used to refer to a regulatory mechanism that partially or
wholly impedes, interrupts, or suspends trading of a financial security (or the entire market) should price or volatility levels reach
pre-defined key levels. This control mechanism gained notoriety following the Black Monday crash of October 1987 and has since
then been a staple tool of exchanges and regulators to avert panic during large sell-offs. Though studied extensively over the past
few decades, interest in circuit breakers is undergoing a resurgence, spurred, inter alia, by the flash crash of May 2010 in US
markets, repeated flash crashes in Cryptocurrency exchanges in 2017, the Brexit referendum, and large intraday plunges of the
DJIA in February 2018. Regulators’ purported raison d’etre for it is to inhibit investor overreaction, enforce control at micro-
structure level, prevent crashes, and to smoothen volatility. These barriers are generally of two kinds: trading halts (suspensions)
and price limits. Halts entail a temporary suspension of the trading session; a time-out. They can be market-wide or asset specifictiaz@sifat.asia (I.M. Sifat), m.azhar@iium.edu.my, dr@azharmohamad.asia (A. Mohamad).
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specifying a tolerable channel of volatility around a reference value that is based on previous session’s settling price. While
traditionally limits were set on a daily basis, it is increasingly common now for exchanges to enforce intraday limits. The magnitude
and category of price limits exhibit considerable global variation. Nevertheless, regulators in emerging markets appear keener to
enforce limits, motivated ostensibly by stymying large fluctuations stemming from noise trades or trades by a large pool of
inexperienced (uninformed) investors. In fact, except for rare cases (e.g., Australian Stock Exchange), it is hard to find any ex-
change in developed economies without an active circuit breaker practice.
The practice of circuit breakers has long been a subject of interest to market agents and researchers. Although the regulators and
exchanges have viewed favorably this practice, academics’ position on its utility has been mixed. Much of the latter’s interest
manifests itself in debates over efficiency of the practice and whether the intended regulatory objectives are achieved. Conse-
quently, the role of circuit breakers in curbing volatility, suppression and migration of liquidity, spillover and contagion of
volatility, etc. have received considerable attention. The results are largely mixed but can be argued to be slightly tilted against the
regulatory practice. As such, skepticism regarding circuit breakers’ usefulness persists. It is worth noting that all the possible effects
of circuit breakers stated above are ex-post in nature. That is to say that the researchers’ primary focus has been on scrutiny of the
aftermath of a trade constraint. These effects aside, some scholars point out that circuit breakers may prompt an ex-ante gravi-
tational effect without requiring market agents to forego trading discretion. The argument is that the existence of circuit breaker
itself can incentivize market agents to rush their trading decisions when price nears the constraint threshold, which catalyzes
achievement of the threshold. This possibility is known as the magnet effect. This hypothesis states that circuit breakers—by the
very existence—attract trading activities toward themselves, usually after a certain threshold has been crossed. Thus, if a magnet
effect exists, the circuit breaker in play would be directly contributing to the same problem it is designed to forestall. Whether this
effect exists in practice has been the subject of considerable conjecture and debate. Following a largely theoretical series of
propositions and models in the early 1990s, empirical works post-2000s exhibit inconsistent and mixed results. The lack of
generalizability of these results is further compounded by the variation in results due to heterogenous exchange-specific rules and
the nature of intervention; i.e. whether it is a trading halt or a price limit or other combinations. Moreover, the majority of
scholarly works till date had to focus on individual stocks or futures since market-wide circuit breaker triggers are extremely rare.
As such, even if circuit breakers carry a built-in design flaw in the form of magnet effect, substantiating it has proven difficult.
Notable among these challenges is access to–and identification of–data representative of investors’ trading sentiment near the
barrier threshold. This makes the popularly used daily time-series datasets unsuitable for identifying magnet effect. Nonetheless, a
sizeable number of earlier studies employed daily data near the beginning of theoretical development of magnet effect literature.
This problem has waned in recent years as high-frequency data has become more accessible. Furthermore, insights from behavioral
finance are beginning to be incorporated into market microstructure literature, of which magnet effect hypothesis is a beneficiary.
Consequently, within the broader debate over circuit breakers’ efficacy, the magnet effect hypothesis is starting to receive more
attention than before, leading to a growing number of papers examining the possibility of a magnetic pull by circuit breakers. As
the theory and empirics on the concept approaches maturity, we observe that till date (as of 2019) no formal survey has been
attempted on the magnet effect alone. This motivates us to undertake a critical review of the magnet effect studies to distill some
key takeaways from the current state of knowledge.
Our survey contributes to finance literature in three ways. First, given the maturity of research onmagnet effect hypothesis in market
microstructure, this paper presents the first (to the authors’ best knowledge) formal review of the ex-ante magnet phenomenon. This is
in contrast to most prior surveys on circuit breakers (Holder, Ma, & Mallett, 2002; Kim & Yang, 2004; Abad & Pascual, 2013, pp.
303–324) where discussion on the magnet effect featured in a modest scope and was somewhat subsumed under broader circuit breaker
efficiency discourse. Secondly, the proliferation of recent empirical works has generated an impressive body of findings since last major
reviews. This paper updates the literature and consolidates the research streams thematically. Lastly, after a relative stagnation of
theoretical development in the topic for nearly two decades, recently some breakthroughs in modeling and approaches have been
observed (e.g., Chen, Petukhov, &Wang, 2018; Lera, Sornette, & Ulmann, 2019). This paper surveys the new approaches critically and
recommends avenues for advancing the discourse further.
2. Circuit breaker praxis
In a frictionless financial market, trading collars would be unnecessary. However, in reality, most exchanges prefer having at disposal
a lever to protect the market agents from excessive volatility—or at least project the appearance of attempting to protect investor in-
terests in this way. Thus, the common raison d’etre trumpeted by exchanges and regulators is to facilitate a window of re-assessment. Its
purport is to help traders calm down and reflect on news and fundamentals of underlying assets when the security trading gets too
volatile. Following introduction in post-Black-Monday (1987) climate which sawworld markets crashing, it is easy to see why regulators
found the option palatable to regulate sharp declines or rises of asset or index prices within a day. The same allure holds today. This
regulatory preference is clearly manifested in the near ubiquity of the practice on a global scale. There are considerable variations,
however, regarding what type of circuit breakers are employed. Some markets enforce both market-wide and single-stock circuit139
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as Volatility Interruption.1 Markets without any limiting mechanisms exist also but are increasingly rare. Fig. 1 below provides a
classification of different kinds of circuit breakers. Following that, Table 1 presents a short overview of the current circuit breaker
regimes in important global exchanges as of 2019 (see Table 2).
3. Justifications for circuit breakers
Pricing efficiency lies at the heart of financial market integrity. Not only do prices channel savings mobilization and resource
allocation, they also determine worth and signal liquidity demand or supply. Therefore, malfunctioning price signals from a market
suggest that demand and supply are no longer supreme determinants and/or arbitrage opportunities exist. Consequently, regulatory
intervention to iron out such kinks, in theory, appears condign. Moreover, historical contextualization of circuit breakers’ earliest
adoptions (late 1980s) helps rationalize the regulatory need for drastic intervention considering “Black Swan” emergencies. Although
the intent behind this regulatory practice is noble, whether it truly delivers the desired benefits is worthy of a closer look, especially in
light of academic and public skepticism.
Originally, support for the circuit breaker mechanism came from the report by the Brady Commission in 1988 following orders by
President Reagan’s administration to prevent abnormal crashes in the markets. The practice gained support from Ma, Rao, and Sears
(1989), who advanced the “cool off” hypothesis, which states circuit breakers have the potential to stabilize prices by suppressing large
swings caused by speculation or panic, which, in turn, could discourage manipulation. Others also noted that since traders are at liberty
to alter or withdraw their limit orders during trade interruptions, it could help informed traders devise better risk management plans
without incurring losses. These could, in aggregate, ameliorate liquidity and participation in times of market duress, and aid conver-
gence on equilibrium price once trade resumes (Copeland & Galai, 1983). Furthermore, Greenwald and Stein (1988) argue that price
discovery could quicken, and information asymmetry improve as circuit breakers can better educate the market at times of broken
information transmission (through quotes).
From a design perspective, regulators understand that circuit breakers can be used as a make-shift brake against fast or abrupt price
changes. The opponents, however, point out that fast-changing price dynamics is not necessarily undesirable, especially if it arises
because of newly available sensitive information. In such a case, a trading barrier would only delay the realization of market consensus.
Besides, when price formation is disturbed, investors are unable to form price expectations. Though, if a mechanism were to be
developed that is capable of blocking panic-induced trades from noise traders, the effects of non-fundamental volatility could be
diminished. Also, order imbalance originating from frequent noise trades can be interrupted since a trade barrier eliminates the traders’
opportunity to execute orders in an order book of sub-optimal depth. At this stage, market makers would be incentivized to capitalize on
the liquidity shortage (Kodres & O’Brien, 1994). In these situations, some have shown that if prices fluctuate excessively as a result of
noise trades, informed traders recoil from the order book because of heightened uncertainty surrounding the rate at which their orders
will be executed (Greenwald & Stein, 1991). Consequently, their transaction risk falls. On the flip side, informed traders may feel
disincentivized to monitor the price dynamics if they are aware that they will be notified in the event of a trade barrier. This could lead to
degradation of market liquidity in between trading halts; reinforcing the noise-induced volatility (Fong, 1996). Additionally, in
countries where more than one stock exchange exists, a trigger in one venue can affect other(s). This problem has now expanded beyond
geographical boundaries as cross-border market integrations are becoming more common; especially in Europe. This has led to some
calling for synchronizing the regulatory actions between exchanges to forestall toxic order flow migration and to preserve liquidity
(Chen et al., 2018).
In addition to the criticisms outlined above, proliferation of high frequency trading, algorithmic trading, and recurrences of flash
crashes re-ignite the question of whether a regulatory mechanism devised for a market ecosystem of 30 years ago is still useful today. As
important as the discussion of circuit breakers’ relevance in the modern market is, it is not the primary focus of this paper. Rather, in this
section we have attempted to present a brief snapshot of the major pros and cons of the practice to allow the reader contextualize the
upcoming discussion on magnet effect in the domain of market microstructure scholarship. In the next few pages, we discuss the
theoretical and empirical works surrounding the magnet effect.
4. Theoretical works on magnet effect
Up until Brennan (1986) proposed using limits as a roundabout substitute for futures market margins to minimize investor default
risk, hardly any theoretical discussion existed regardingwhat is known as circuit breaker in themodern day. Among the earliest theorists
of the potential for a magnet effect was Miller (1989), who conjectured that trade barriers can induce a flurry of fear-fueled trades in the1 Volatility Interruption refers to a practice where continuous trading is interrupted if the next potential execution of a market/limit order falls
outside the pre-set range around a reference price. In case of such a triggering order, some exchanges partially execute the order before halting trade,
while others outright reject the order. The rising popularity of the volatility interruption scheme can be partly attributed to the proliferation of high
frequency and program-based trading around the world, which brings along with it a heightened risk of sudden liquidity evaporation. This fear, along
with the structural flexibility of the mechanism, MiFID implementation in Europe, and failure (and immediate abandonment) of market-wide trading
halt in China in 2016 are among the reasons driving exchanges to adopt volatility interruption as a preferred mechanism. In fact, the recently adopted
Limit-up Limit-down (LULD) scheme in the US can be argued to be a variant of volatility interruption given that it relies on a recursive window
enforcement of a 5%/10% channel around the prior 5 min’ trades.
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Fig. 1. Circuit breaker classification.
I.M. Sifat, A. Mohamad International Review of Economics and Finance 69 (2020) 138–151direction of the barrier if the agents suspect they cannot close an open position. Later, Greenwald and Stein (1991) argued by
formulating two theoretical models that sacrificing the timeliness benefit of continuous trading at the expense of efficiency has some
merit if the source of disturbance to the market (or order book) is large volume shocks. In such a situation, they add, circuit breakers can
help future orders rely on a more relevant (larger) information set. Moreover, traders are participation-averse when uncertainty am-
plifies concerning the fair value of an asset. Greenwald and Stein also assigned random and exogenous values to value-minded market
players who are forced to adjust their trading plans due to noise and volume shocks arising from uninformed traders’ orders. Moreover,
the authors hint at an extra layer of transaction risk incurred by informed agents arising from the cost associated with uncertainty
revolving around the number of active participants closely watching the market in stressful periods. Thus, usually, the informed traders
retire from the order book if they perceive quick price movements to be caused by uninformed trades. We note, however, that although
this model accounts for the value-seeking agents, it neglects the distinction between the early and late responders. Nevertheless, the
model’s contribution has been significant in shaping the future theoretical works. Case in point, Kodres and O’Brien (1994) design a
Pareto-Optimal model of risk sharing via diminishing unanticipated volatility dynamics. The model predicts that circuit breakers can
help market makers and liquidity providers save in transaction expenses who can otherwise not afford to continually monitor the market
activities. On a related note, Gerety and Mulherin (1992) highlight the tradeoff of calming volatility at the expense of illiquidity and
aggravated credit problems in the event of a margin call. Additionally, the authors deduce from their results that forcing some investors
into continued ownership when they would rather transfer the risk to those more willing is detrimental to market efficiency. They
further extend this argument, buttressed by McMillan’s (1990) gravitational effect model, that barriers to trade could make investors
skittish once a threshold percentage of the permissible fluctuation band is achieved—leading to negative welfare. Meanwhile, arguing
from a pricing efficiency standpoint, Chowdhry and Nanda (1998) advance a model that postulates circuit breakers can aid in elimi-
nating potentially inefficient prices. Moreover, the authors predict that price limits coupled with elastic margin requirements can
significantly stabilize a troubled market.
Among the few theoretical works in early the new millennium, Chou, Lin, and Yu (2003) develop a model which demonstrates the
utility of circuit breakers in countering default risk and margin requirements. Though the features of this model are different from
Brennan’s, its conclusions are identical. Another model by Westerhoff (2003) predicts that trading barriers have the capacity for
maximizing social welfare by smoothening volatility.
The earliest theoretical works, as discussed above, focus on circuit breakers operational in continuous (simple) trading platforms. A
notable exception is Madhavan’s (1992) work, who recommends switching to a call auction in a harried market. Moreover, Madhavan
argues that continuous markets may be sub-optimal when information asymmetry is high; hence, enforcing a halt can exacerbate the
initial problem. Besides, resumption of continuous trade with re-established information flow may prove difficult. Instead, periodic
trading systems can be more useful in addressing the information asymmetry problem. Thus, Madhavan’s suggestion is to switch to a
stop-gap call auction to avoid market failure. In fact, he argues a batch market will outperform a trading halt since a discrete trading
system can remain alive in the event of dealers’ refusal to act as market makers and thus providing information signals facilitating
resumption of normal trades. Additionally, the model proposes tethering the trigger stochastically to recent volume and spreads. It
should lead to a bid-spread greater than a preset critical level and thus outperform the conventional trading halts since large price
changes can occur because of change in underlying fundamentals.2
Another stream of theoretical works focus on trading strategies of informed traders and liquidity providers. Pioneering among them
was Subrahmanyam (1994), who proposed a model suggesting the possibility of a magnet effect, first hinted at by Lehmann (1989). In
Subrahmanyam’s model, rule-based halts give incentive to noise (uninformed) actors to hurry their trades in a concerted way, which2 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Dynamic Circuit Breaker practice today is similar to what Madhavan had envisioned.
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Table 1
Circuit breaker practices around the world.
No
Panel A: Australasia





SSE Shanghai China 10% A-Shares; different limits for special treatment
stocks
2 Hong Kong Stock
Exchange
HKEX Hong Kong Hong Kong 10% Volatility Control Mechanism suspends trading
for 5 min if limit is exceeded.
3 Tokyo Stock
Exchange
TSE Tokyo Japan ¥30-
¥7000000
Absolute Yen values depending on price day’s
closing price or special quote




5 Taiwan Stock Exch TSE Taipei Taiwan 10% No limit for newly listed stocks. Non-
convertible bonds are subject to 5% limit.
6 Indonesia Stock
Exchange
IDX Jakarta Indonesia 10%
7 Bursa Malaysia MYX Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 30% 8% FBMKLCI is subject to 1 h of trading halt if





BMDB Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 10% Not applicable to spot month trades of futures.
9 Philippine Stock
Exch








SGX Singapore Singapore 10% 5-min cooling period. SGX is, as of 2019,
mulling 30% and 10% collars for pre-
opening and mid-day/closing auctions.
11 Stock Exchange of
Thailand
SET Bangkok Thailand 30% 1 price
spread
60% fluctuation is tolerated for foreign stocks
12 National Stock
Exchange of India
NSE Mumbai India 10%
15%
20%
None Different tiers apply to different times of the
day, leading to halts of 15, 45 or 105 min. In
case of subsequent trigger, daylong trading may
be suspended.




PSX Karachi Pakistan 5%, 7.5%,
10%
None
14 Tadawul TADAWUL Riyadh Saudi Arabia 10% None
15 Borsa Istanbul ISE Istanbul Turkey 10% None 15-min suspension
16 NASDAQ Dubai Dubai UAE 10%
17 Australian
Securities Exchange
ASX Sydney Australia None None Provisions for halt on discretionary basis or at
the request of a company or anticipating
announcement.
18 New Zealand Stock
Exchange
NZSX Wellington New Zealand Varying Varying Ranges from 10% to 85% for minimum offer
prices based on references prices. For bid prices,
the band is substantially wider; ranging from
125% to 1000%.
Panel B: Africa
No Exchange Symbol City Country Static Limit Dynamic
Limit
Remarks







3 The Egyptian Stock
Exch
EGX Cairo Egypt 10% 5% 30-min suspension for dynamic limit triggers
4 Ghana Stock Exch GSE Accra Ghana 7.5%
5 Nairobi Securities
Exch
NSE Nairobi Kenya 10% Overnight
6 Malawi Stock Exch MSE Blantyre Malawi None None
7 Stock Exch of
Mauritius
SEM Port Louis Mauritius None None
8 Casablanca Stock
Exch
Casa SE Casablanca Morocco None None
9 Bolsa de Valores de
Mozambique
BVM Maputo Mozambique 15% None
10 Nigerian Stock Exch NSE Lagos Nigeria 10% Compounded
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued )
No
Panel A: Australasia





JSE Johannesburg South Africa None None
Panel C: Europe
No. Exchange Symbol City Country Static Limit Dynamic
Limit
Remarks
1 Wiener B€orse XWBO Vienna Austria 2%–4% None Exchange discretion
2 Euronext Paris XPAR Paris France 10% 2% 4-min suspension
3 Deutsche B€orse
Group
XETRA Frankfurt Germany 5% Conditional Depends on volatility
4 Athens Stock Exch XATH Athens Greece 10%–20% None 15-min break.
10% for FTSE/ASE20
5 Irish Stock Exch XDUB Dublin Ireland None None Depends on volatility
6 Borsa Italiana XMIL Milan Italy 10% None Based on opening price
7 Euronext
Amsterdam
XAMS Amsterdam Netherlands 10% 2% Based on overnight price change
8 Oslo Stock
Exchange
XOSL Oslo Norway None None Exchange discretion
9 Moscow Exchange MISX Moscow Russia 30%–40% None Doesn’t apply to negotiated trades
10 Stockholm Stock
Exchange
XSTO Stockholm Sweden None None
11 SIX Swiss Exchange XSWX Zürich Switzerland None 1.5% 5-min interruption
12 London Stock
Exchange
XLON London UK Yes 5% 5-min interruption
Panel D: North America





TSX Toronto Canada 10% None 5-min cooling period
2 NASDAQ NASDAQ New York USA 7%, 13%,
20%
None Market-wide
3 New York Stock
Exchange (1)
NYSE New York USA 7%, 13%,
20%
None Rule 7.12-E: part of cross-market trading halt
scheme that can be activated in 3 levels. This
pilot project has been proposed to be extended
as of 3rd quarter of 2019.
3 New York Stock
Exchange (2)
NYSE New York USA 5%; 10% LULD: Limit-up Limit-down scheme is a trading
curb that imposes a two-tiered limit based on
Tier 1 and Tier 2 classification and nominal
value of the stocks. For stocks valued over $3,
5% and 10% are imposed for Tiers 1 and 2
during market hours. For stocks valued between
$0.75 and $3, a uniform limit of 20% applies.
The above limits do not apply during market
open or close.
3 New York Stock
Exchange (3)
NYSE New York USA 10%, 20%,
30%
Rule 80B: three levels of market wide circuit
breaker are activated based on a 10%, 20% or
30% drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
4 Chicago Mercantile
Exchange
CME Chicago USA DCB Variant Dynamic Circuit Breaker (DCB) references the
prior day’s settlement price during market
opening to set upper/lower limits through a
rolling lookback window. Triggering the circuit
breaker reinstates the order book to pre-open
market state for 2 min.
Note: This table chronicles the various circuit breakers employed by stock exchanges around the world. The information is procured from a variety of
sources including public domain information, website disclosures, day trading of the world guidebooks, consultancy firm reports, etc.
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particularly depressed in near-trigger ticks. A year later, Subrahmanyam (1995) expounds on his original argument and predicts that
discretion based halts should function better than rule-based halts in escalating the magnet effect. In a later paper, Subrahmanyam
(1997) shows that when investors believe a trigger-hit to be imminent, informed and liquid traders can temporarily withdraw their
order book presence to avert a trigger hit. As this leads to liquidity depression, the model suggests introducing randomness at the
regulator’s discretion so as to not allow informed traders the opportunity to strategically retire from the order book. Subrahmanyam’s
series of explanations of the magnet effect provides the baseline for much of the empirical works attempted post-1997.
Though not a formal examination of the magnet effect, Slezak’s (1994) multi-period model of market closures strengthened the case143
Table 2
Survey of empirical works on magnet effect.







1 Arak & Cook 1997 USA: Treasury Bond Futures Intraday 1980–1987 No Two multiple linear models
2 Berkman &
Steenbeek
1998 Japan: Nikkei 225 Futures Intraday 1992 No Quadratic model
3 Huang et al. 2001 Taiwan: Stocks End of
Day
1990–1996 No Event study
4 Hall & Kofman 2001 USA: Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice
Futures (FCOJ) on NYBOT
End of
Day
1988 No GARCH (1,1)
5 Cho et al. 2003 Taiwan: Stocks Intraday 1998–199 Yes AR (3) GARCH (2,2)
6 Goldstein &
Kavajecz
2004 USA: NYSE Market Intraday 1997 Yes Event study
7 Chan et al. 2005 Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
Stocks
Intraday 1995–1996 Yes Event study
8 Du et al. 2006 Korea: Stocks Intraday 1998–1999 Yes Time-distanced quadratic
modeling
9 Bildik & Gulay 2006 Turkey: Borsa Istanbul Stocks End of
Day
1998–2002 Yes Kim and Rhee (1997)
10 Abad & Pascual 2007 Spain: Spanish Stock Exchange Stocks Intraday 2001–2006 No Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(via FGLS)
11 Hsieh et al. 2007 Taiwan: Stocks Intraday 2002 Yes Logistic regression
12 Wong et al. 2009 China: Shanghai Stocks Intraday 2002 Yes Monte Carlo simulation; AR (3)
GARCH (2,2)
13 Hsieh et al. 2009 Taiwan: Stocks Intraday 2000 Yes Logistic regression




1997–2002 Yes Logistic regression
15 Omar 2012 Egypt: Stocks End of
Day
1999–2009 Yes Event study
16 Levy et al. 2013 USA: Pork Bellies and Oats Futures End of
Day
1970–2010 Yes Logistic regression
17 Kim et al. 2013 China: Stocks End of
Day
1997–2000 No Event study
18 Dabbou 2013 Tunisia: Stocks End of
Day
2007 No ARIMA




2014 UK: FTSE-100 Stocks Intraday 2011 Yes MA (1) EGARCH; Variance Ratio
21 Wan et al. 2015 China: Stocks Intraday 2000–2012 No Comparison of probability density
functions
22 Wu et al. 2017 China: Shanghai and Shenzen Stocks Intraday 2000–2011 Yes Multiple linear regression
23 Wong et al. 2020 China: Shanghai and Shenzen Index and
Stocks
Intraday 2016 Yes AR (3) GARCH (2,2)
24 Lu 2016 China End of
Day
1997–2012 No Event study




2016 Turkey: Borsa Istanbul Stocks End of
Day
1995–2013 Yes Propensity score matching
27 Aktas 2016 Turkey: BIST-30 Stocks Intraday 2008 Yes Event study
28 Sifat &
Mohamad
2018 Malaysia: Stocks Intraday 2015–2017 Yes Non-linear Autoregressive
Distributed Lags
29 Wan et al. 2018 China: Stocks Intraday 2000–2011 No Logistic regression
30 Syed & Auret 2018 South Africa: Commodities End of
Day
2010–2017 Yes Mean comparison
31 Clapham 2018 Xetra and BME: Stocks Intraday 2011–2015 No Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(via FGLS)
32 Sifat et al. 2019 Malaysia: Stocks End of
Day




2019 NASDAQ: Stocks Intraday 2010–2014 Yes Paired t-test; Wilcoxon-Cox
Ranked Sum Test
Note: This table chronicles the empirical works surrounding magnet effect of stocks and/or futures up until 2019.
I.M. Sifat, A. Mohamad International Review of Economics and Finance 69 (2020) 138–151for it through demonstration of risk redistribution across time and different market players in the presence of a trade closures. Most
importantly, the model showed that informed participants’ risk rose at a higher pace, motivating them to engage in trades that would
insure them against the possibility of being locked out of a position. That fear functions as an extra source of risk, requiring further
insurance trades. Slezak’s report is quite striking considering he clearly distinguishes between the risk distribution effects of market
closures in a pre- and post-basis. Meanwhile, in an experimental exercise using simulations, Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman’s (2001)144
I.M. Sifat, A. Mohamad International Review of Economics and Finance 69 (2020) 138–151model reports that in the face of impending circuit breaker trigger, traders hasten their orders; a finding that indirectly supports the
magnet effect.
After a relative theoretical lull of nearly 15 years, two important works in recent times have re-ignited the circuit breaker debate: the
first by suggesting designing a barrier based on variables other than observed price (Chen et al., 2018), and the other by quantifying the
effect of circuit breakers by performing counterfactual analysis tied to fundamental values (Lera et al., 2019). Firstly, Chen et al.
construct a dynamic model to examine the effects of market-wide circuit breakers on trading and price dynamics. Their model shows
that the benefits of lower price-dividend ratio and shrinkage of daily fluctuation limit leads to higher conditional and realized volatility.
Additionally, the model’s predictions suggest that market-wide circuit breakers elevate the likelihood of a stock triggering the circuit
breaker once a certain threshold is breached; i.e., the magnet effect. Such an effect is stronger when the source of the shock is
fundamental in nature, or if it stems from market agents’ cognitive biases.
In an important recent breakthrough within circuit breaker literature, Lera et al. (2019) propose a General Circuit Breaker Equation
(GCBE), which postulates a counterfactual fundamental value (f) that would prevail if the circuit breaker had not existed.
st ¼ ft þ phitγðft  sÞþ phitγμðE½ts  t þΔth Eq. (1)
The authors posit the underlying dynamic of this (log(f)) fundamental value is underpinned by a stochastic process with a continuous
random walk, negative drift, and constant volatility. Thereafter, the authors disaggregate the effect of the circuit breaker by imposing a
trading barrier effect on the fundamental value via decomposing the difference between price formation (s) and fundamental value (f).
Their numerical analysis finds that volatility waxes as price approaches the limit, consistent with many prior empirical works. The
authors also demonstrate the utility of the GCBE by modeling the behavior of Shanghai CSI-300 index, Bitcoin futures, and S&P500
Index against it. The GCBE framework also confirmed the magnet effect for all realistic combinations of different parameters.
5. Empirical findings on magnet effect
The earliest investigators of magnet effect observed that during an abnormally optimistic or pessimistic price juncture in futures
markets, traders relentlessly trade at prices near the trigger points, helping push the price to the limit. The flurry of trading activity and
its direction near the price limit has since then been attributed to: (a) investor apprehension toward illiquidity (in case of markets where
limits trigger suspension) and (b) fear of missing out on a trend. Following further development of the theory and crystallization of the
magnet effect framework according to the discussions of Madhavan and Subrahmanyam, empirical results of studies after 1997 indicate
mixed results regarding existence and strength of such an effect. In particular, a distinct divide is observed between futures and equity
markets, whereby evidence is weaker for the former. The opposite is largely true for equities. In the following subsections, the empirical
works are systematically reviewed based on their findings for or against the magnet effect, followed by a discussion on the prevalent
methodological and data-based approaches.
5.1. Studies confirming the magnet effect
The number of studies finding magnet effect in the stock markets is comparatively higher than those that do not. The most highly
examined stock markets are China (Wong et al., 2009a,b; Xu, Zhang, & Liu, 2014) and Taiwan (Cho et al., 2003; Hsieh, Kim, & Yang,
2007, 2009). Among the developed markets, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) reported on the existence of magnet effect based on
event-study approach on New York Stock Exchange stocks. A recent investigation of the NASDAQ by Hautsch and Horvath (2019)
provides support for the phenomena observed by Goldstein and Kavajecz. Moser’s (1990) results for London Stock Exchange, too, are
suggestive of a magnet effect corresponding to intraday auctions (AESP) triggered by order movements. Interestingly, a large portion of
magnet effect studies hail from Asian exchanges, where price limits are significantly more popular than elsewhere in the world. Among
these studies, Du, Liu, and Rhee (2009) report that magnet effect exists for stocks based on two-year KRX intraday data. For Turkey, all
paper investigating the phenomenon report affirmative results, whether using end of day or intraday (Aktas, 2016), data. Similar
confirmations are reported for stocks in Malaysia and Egypt (Chan, Kim, & Rhee, 2005; Omar, 2012; Sifat & Mohamad, 2018; Tooma,
2011). In contrast to the abundant positive evidence in stocks, only a handful of studies find magnet effect in futures. Key among them is
Levy, Qadan, and Yagil’s (2013) work on Pork Bellies and Oats futures in the US based on a 41-year dataset. More recently, Sayed and
Auret (2018) show the same for Maize futures in South Africa.
5.2. Studies failing to confirm the magnet effect
Though smaller in number compared to the affirmative findings, several studies fail to findmagnet effect in stockmarkets. Prominent
among them are: Huang, Fu, and Ke (2001) for Taiwan, Abad and Pascual (2007) for Spain, Kim, Liu, and Yang (2013), Hao (2016), and
Wan et al. (2015) for China, Dabbou (2013) for Tunisia, and Clapham (2018) for Germany. Aside from Hao’s work which deals with
market-wide circuit breaker, the remaining papers mentioned above deal with individual stocks. Meanwhile, for futures, evidence
against the magnet effect is more commonplace (Arak & Cook, 1997; Berkman & Steenbeek, 1998; Hall & Kofman, 2001).
It is important to note that while the papers mentioned above–for both stocks and futures–do not find evidence for magnet effect, the
findings do not necessarily imply a retarding effect of the circuit breaker; i.e., the barrier repels trades away from realization of the
trigger. Such a phenomenon, which can be a vindication of the regulatory practice, has been documented by Arak and Cook (1997), who
call it the repellant effect. The authors employ two models to study US treasury bond futures in the mornings after a substantial145
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price reversal ensues. This reversal shows sensitivity to how close the prices are to the trigger point and exhibits a mild repellant effect,
in opposition to the hypothesized magnet effect. The repellant effect was also found later by Hall and Kofman (2001) in five agricultural
futures contracts in Chicago Board of Trade. It should be pointed out, however, empirical findings from futures markets are not
generalizable for equities, since derivatives are known to have close substitute contracts. Nevertheless, the repellant effect, in a mod-
erate form, has been reported for Shanghai Stocks by Wan, Wang, Jiang, Xie, and Zhou (2018) and for Malaysian equities by Sifat,
Mohamad, and Hamid (2019).
5.3. Methodologies
Among all the studies surveyed for the purpose of this paper, event study methodology appears to be overwhelmingly the most
popular technique, which is often paired with parametric and nonparametric tests of changes or comparisons between means and
variances of pre-event and post-event groups. This approach has been applied to both daily and intraday datasets (Chan et al., 2005; Kim
et al., 2013). The next most commonly used technique is a binary classification approach via logistic regression, whereby the dependent
variable is assigned a 0 or 1 value based on whether the corresponding event triggered the circuit breaker threshold or not. This
approach was pioneered by Hsieh et al. (2007, 2009) and later followed by Tooma (2011), Levy et al. (2013), and Wan et al. (2018).
Meanwhile, two other important papers–by Cho et al. (2003) and Abad and Pascual (2007)–adopted drastically different approaches by
relying on autoregressive modeling and seemingly unrelated regression modeling respectively. Interestingly, the quadratic modeling
approach of earlier studies (Berkman& Steenbeek, 1998; Du, Liu,& Rhee, 2007) was not adopted by subsequent researchers at all. Some
authors, however, have tried to innovate by using uncommon techniques to capture themagnet effect. For example, Xu et al. (2014) look
at the power law dynamics of cumulative abnormal returns in the post-event hit window to infer the strength and existence of magnet
effect. Brugler and Linton (2014) augment the classical Cho et al. (2003) by using an asymmetric flavor of GARCH, augmented with
Variance Ratio testing. Sifat and Mohamad (2018) use an NARDL on order aggression and observed price dynamics to infer whether
gravitational pull exists. Danisoglu and Guner (2016) use a propensity score matching approach for Turkey.
5.4. Extrapolating magnet effect from data
Given the abstract nature of magnet effect, detection of such phenomenon has to be extrapolated in several ways. First off, inten-
sification of order submission (sell orders in a bearish scenario and vice versa) as the trigger threshold approaches is a tell-tale indication
of magnet effect. Alternatively, cancellation of limit sale orders, which are to be replaced with market sell-orders can be construed as
signaling magnet effect. This can happen independently of or in conjunction with the first scenario. Moreover, limit order liquidity
providers (both on buy or sell side) could cancel or reposition their trading strategies, fearing a market-wide trade interruption. In this
regard, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) utilized a combination of the above approaches in investigating the market-wide trading halt in
US markets when DJIA marked a substantial decline, falling just 6 points short of the trigger point of 7366. The authors find, consistent
with the hypothesized scenarios above, a larger concentration of significant cancellation of buy-side limit orders in the 9 min prior to
approaching the trigger threshold. While these scenarios appear reasonable for trading halt scenarios, they are transferable for price
limits and volatility interruptions as well.
5.5. Recent innovations
In contrast to the classical approaches outlined above, Brogaard and Roshak (2016) study the largest 2000 US stocks’ extreme price
paths using a difference-in-difference approach. The authors construct a price path before and after introduction of the trading barrier in
2010. Their results from a control group of stocks which was not constrained by limits suggests results consistent with Holding Back
Hypothesis; i.e., traders with good information shy away from trading in price ranges in the vicinity of the trade barrier to avoid tripping
it. Their finding constitutes indirect evidence against magnet effect as per Subrahmanyam’s (1997) prediction. Also, more recently,
Wang, Xu, and Zhang (2019) have studied the effects of market-wide circuit breakers in achieving a cooling off effect both at a macro
and micro level in China using order book data. The authors use a Lasso-based Instrumental Variable model to capture the effects of
microstructure and policy-level regressors and report that circuit breakers fail to cool off the sell pressure, brake the fall of price, curb
volatility or improve order imbalance. Worse yet, the circuit breakers appear to induce magnet effect at individual stock levels by
worsening order imbalance and trade sizes.
5.6. Summary of the survey of empirical findings
In spite of the apparent dominance of findings confirming the magnet effect, it’s fair to surmise that academic consensus is far from
conclusive. This dissensus can be imputed to several factors. First, derivatives markets’ findings aren’t laterally transferable to equities
due to structural differences. Second, most of earlier studies relied on EOD (end-of-day) data to investigate magnet effect instead of limit
order book of trade transactions data. Though availability of tick-dataset in recent years has partially offset this limitation, the un-
availability dilemma persists for a variety of factors: technical constraints, regulatory recalcitrance, costly nature of data, etc. Moreover,
up until very recently, most of the studies neglected incorporating market microstructure indicators such as turnover, volume, quote
spreads, order types, order flow, etc. What’s more, methodology-wise, bulk of the empirical works heavily depend on price-return series
to gauge magnet effect. This strategy remains highly influential due to patronage of two seminal works: Cho et al. (2003) and Hsieh,146
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threshold point for magnet effect. Lastly, the lack of a counterfactual event plagues methodological designs of most studies. In this
regard, the GCBE framework can be put to greater use to fit the circuit breaker behavior of stocks or futures to see if the model generates
more insights compared to common approaches. Also encouraging is Brogaard and Roshak’s (2016) price-path approach, which appears
to be a promising way to deal with the counterfactual conundrum.
6. Empirical challenges
6.1. Counterfactual dilemma
The problem of designing counterfactual scenarios manifests itself in the failure to disentangle the factors explaining why some
assets trigger the circuit breaker and others do not, and also what could have happened had the trade barrier not been in place. Existing
approaches at bypassing this problem relied mainly on using control periods via constructing a sample of pseudo-events which exhibit
threshold-like behavior. One problem of this approach is that pseudo-events are more prone to uncertainty instead of a control sample in
an experimental study. Moreover, this could partially explain why studies using pseudo-events typically exhibit low statistical power in
their results. While designing experimental studies to circumvent this issue may seem appealing, that too comes at a cost. Experimental
designs within market microstructure realm often run the risk of oversimplifying the underlying dynamics of market forces due to being
grounded to a priori theoretical assumptions. Moreover, distinguishing between the behavior of an informed and an amateur investor is
not an easy task. Nevertheless, experimental studies remain the most promising alternative to the prevailing approaches in better
answering whether magnet effect truly exists.
6.2. Volatility
Revisiting the premise that circuit breakers are employed to curtail unwanted volatility, it is necessary to distinguish between types
of volatility. Thus, discriminating between fundamental and transitory volatility is important (Krause& Tse, 2013). This aspect remains
surprisingly ignored in existing empirical works. An exception is the work by Du et al. (2007) whomade an effort to differentiatemagnet
effect from intraday momentum effect. Regulators too are guilty of demonizing volatility as an absolute undesirable. We argue that
straitening fundamental volatility equates promoting pricing inefficiency. So long as price volatility springs from a rational decision
trigger by market actors, it shapes the market’s perception of the altered fundamental value of the asset. Hence, high volatility is not
necessarily an evil that must be shunned. Though we agree with previous researchers–in principle–that transitory volatility should be
treated as undesirable, it is important to trace its sources. Most market microstructure experts impute transitory volatility to friction in
financial markets and the trading processes, such as illiquidity (or fear of it, in case of trading halts), order imbalances, speculation
(which too has its own theory of healthy and unhealthy classification), manipulation, boom-and-bust cycles, overreactions and
underreactions, herding, regulatory constraints, etc. In this regard, the topic of information related changes of price versus friction
induced changes of price and their joint impact on circuit breaker remains largely unaddressed. Furthermore, given the increasing
availability of granular and order flow data, and in presence of high-frequency trading, addressing the behavioral/rational triggers
causing price changes near the threshold is grossly underexplored.
6.3. Futures-specific issues
From a futures market perspective, Margulis (1991) points out that market agents, who in usual conditions act as liquidity providers,
are compelled to withdraw from the market if futures prices draw near the trigger point. Thus, market makers, intraday traders, and
short-term speculators may be spurned by the prospect of holding an overnight risky position and could be forced to alter their trading
strategy. To illustrate further, let us suppose a futures market has fallen drastically. Arbitrageurs in this circumstance would be bearish
(short) on stocks and bullish (long) on futures. Under normal circumstances, liquidity providers, given the spot rate of the underlying
asset/index, buy from the public at a price of P0 while anticipating that if the market moves against them, the position can be closed by
selling the futures down a few ticks; say P0 – T1/2/3/4/5. Hence, when operating in our hypothetical sharp fall market, the liquidity
provider cannot buy from the public at a few ticks above the limit price, because in case the market moves south, the ability to sell—and
thus closing the position—may be jeopardized for an indefinite period. As a result, they would require greater premium to compensate
for inventory risk. Therefore, the logical choice would be to bid at a price much lower than P0, which, incidentally, is a price further
closer to the lower limit. The same holds true for agents would are usually ready to buy at a price a few ticks higher—P0 þ T1/2/3/4/5.
Hence, around ticks in the vicinity of the lower price limit, bid quotes recoil closer to the limit. Due to the lucrative nature of bid
premium around the lower limit (owing to wide spreads), market makers would be happy selling to the public (lift-ask: trading at ask)
while buying (hit-bid: trading at bid) from the public and thus earning a good spread premium. Therefore, the more competitive a
market is, both bid and ask quotes would be skewed towards the lower limit. Similarly, in highly bullish scenarios, quotes would be
skewed closer to the upper limit due to similar magnetic effect.
6.4. VPIN related issues
In addition to classical market safeguards like circuit breakers, an alternative mechanism called Volume Synchronized Probability of
Informed Trading (VPIN) has emerged as a candidate for smoothening volatility in markets. This mechanism relies on quantifying147
I.M. Sifat, A. Mohamad International Review of Economics and Finance 69 (2020) 138–151information asymmetry in the market. Some argue that VPIN can have inadvertent consequences and as such could reinforce the magnet
effect on top of aggravating the documented ex-post effects. For example, assuming a market operates according to Subrahmanyam’s
(1994) model, when VPIN value approaches a limit, it implies a trading constraint is imminent. As a result, market agents are incen-
tivized to shift trading strategies away from a previously desired one, potentially leading to order imbalance in the market. This can, in
turn, compound the magnet effect. Furthermore, similar to Slezak’s (1994) market closure model, VPIN can induce liquidity providers’
premature retirement from the order book, leading to a rise in the spread of smaller orders. Accordingly, short term volatility is likely to
worsen. These issues are, thus far, evaluated mostly on theoretical terms using artificial market models. Whether VPIN would induce or
supplement magnet effect is a matter worthy of incorporation into the ongoing VPIN literature.
7. The way forward
In light of the drawbacks of the existing research as outlined above, we argue that solutions have to be found to address two key
methodological constraints: (a) counterfactual dilemma, and (b) dissection of volatility into desirable and undesirable. On practicality
front, most studies have been unable to satisfy the selection filters for direct comparison of different types of price limits (and/or trading
halts) within the same market. Coursey and Dyl (1990) dabbled into experimental market tests to see how the market would function
with and without trading curbs (both price limits and trading halts). Such efforts have been rarely attempted since then. More empirical
tests along this line are needed to allow optimal decisionmaking by both regulators andmarket operators. In addition to augmenting the
existing trend of natural experiments (e.g., market regulatory changes, event-studies of price limit hits and trading halts), novel
empirical approaches are needed to produce fresh insights about the role of circuit breakers in inducing the magnet effect. Also, barring
a fewminor exceptions, the focus of most papers is invariably on market microstructure variables. The linkage to fundamental economic
and accounting variables are less noticeable.
In addition to our prescriptive remarks above, we note that vast majority of the studies are focused on different aspects of efficiency
or justification of circuit breakers. Less explored is whether circuit breakers can act as an alternative deterrent to market manipulation.
Although no such formal acknowledgement exists from the regulators or exchanges, it is nonetheless somewhat of a received wisdom in
the financial industry (Sifat&Mohamad, 2019). Kim and Park (2010) deal with this issue by advancing a model that shows the tradeoff
of price signaling efficiency prompted by circuit breakers versus discouraging price manipulation. Their model predicts that in the
presence of high fear over market manipulations, exchanges are likeliest to employ circuit breakers. Additionally, they analyze 43
markets’ efficiency performances against individual country’s corruption and law enforcement variables. The latter function is a proxy
for market manipulation. The authors conclude that their model indicates exchanges with countries with high corruption levels and lax
law enforcements exhibit the highest propensity to enact circuit breakers. We find this conclusion interesting, given that previously
McDonald and Michayluk (2003) hinted that circuit breakers themselves can be wielded as a tool for manipulation, based on close
examination of suspicious activities near the threshold point in French market. This issue of circuit breakers as an antidote to—versus a
tool of—manipulation is surprisingly under-explored. Meanwhile, though focusing not quite on suspicious trading activities, a relevant
new explanation for the existence of the magnet effect has been tested by Chen, Gao, He, Jiang, and Xiong (2019), who ascribe the
journey of the price towards the limit to deliberate effort by large investors. The authors dissect transaction level data according to
investor groups and report that price limits induce a pattern of pushing the price near to upper limit by large investors who then go on to
sell the stock the following day. We find this approach of bifurcating the order flow along institutional and retail lines to be promising
which merits more empirical testing; even better if the studies can be designed to test behavioral biases underpinning trading prefer-
ences of different classes of investors.
Another interesting new remark concerning the ex-ante gravitational effects of price limits has been provided in a recent unpublished
work by Chong and Kwok (2019). In the process of quantifying the interference effect of price limits on trading activities, the authors
conjecture that the effect is higher for upper limit hits compared to lower limit hits because of a ban on short selling, coupled with the
possibility of a magnet effect due to inexperienced traders’ irrational optimism in buying securities even at the upper limit but reluctance
to sell at the lower limit due to a hope that the Chinese government would intervene and inject liquidity in the system to push prices
higher. This conjecture lays the groundwork for an interesting avenue of research where the interaction between an ex-ante and ex-post
hypothesis (trading interference vs. magnet effect) can be studied at greater depth. In this regard, a noteworthy approach is observed in
the study by Jian, Zhu, Zhou, and Wu (2018), who dissemble magnet effect hypothesis into three parts: trend, volatility, and extreme
market risk. They investigate the same using high-frequency data for Chinese index futures and find evidence mostly supportive of a
cooling effect, with an exception found in futures’ proclivity for a negative jump when CSI-300 index nears the market-wide circuit
breaker threshold. In addition to these novelties, we note that a unique study quantizes the market quality spillover effect of halted
stocks to non-halted stocks during the single-stock circuit breaker program by the SEC in the US (Cui & Gozluklu, 2016). The authors
report that circuit breakers interfere not merely with the activities of the halted stocks but also those not halted via the arbitrage and
speculative channels. Along this line, the authors propose that the idea of Tobin Tax (transaction tax) be revived for speculative
activities.
In recent times, the proliferation of high-speed algorithmic trading provides another fertile ground for empirical research intomagnet
effect. This phenomenon was obviously absent when circuit breakers were conceptualized. More specifically with respect to magnet
effect, we note that bulk of the developed market literature surveyed in this paper deal with empirical testing on data or periods without
the presence of high frequency or algorithmic trading. Also, earlier works with end of day data had no way of accounting for the
presence and effect of high-frequency traders. Although intraday data appears to feature more prominently in recent years, most of them
are aggregations of insufficiently granular seconds or minutes returns and thus do not fully capture dynamics of the magnet effect at the
agents’ decision-making level. As a result, understanding of high-frequency traders’ contribution to or deterring of magnet effect is148
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on magnet effect and perhaps broader circuit breaker and market efficiency debate. Firstly, Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2014)
introduce the idea of volume synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) to measure short-term toxicity-induced volatility and
suggest it as an early warning system for regulators before triggering trading halts or other actions to prevent crashes. VPIN is
controversial, however, due to possibilities of false positives, limited preventive capacity, difficulty in calculation in fragmented or
single trading platforms (Chakrabarty, Pascual, & Shkilko, 2015), statistical integrity (O’Hara, 2015), and unfavorable findings from
various empirical studies (Cheung, Chou, & Lei, 2015; P€oppe, Moos, & Schiereck, 2016). In a similar vein, Bethel, Leinweber, Ruebel,
and Wu (2011) suggest a yellow-light signal approach in real time to allow regulators to decelerate the trading pace rather than suspend
trading.
Radical suggestions like Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN: a proxy to measure information asymmetry)
can have inadvertent consequences as well. It is entirely possible that—like circuit breakers—VPIN may reinforce the magnet effect on
top of deteriorating volatility and worsening liquidity. For instance, in a Subrahmanyam-esque market, VPIN approaching a limit means
an impending halt. Thus, some market actors trade prematurely (i.e., in advance of what an optimal trading strategy entails), which
intensifies order imbalance and—ipso facto—pushes VPIN towards the limit. Additionally, liquid investors may recoil from trading
activities since the ex-ante impact of limits/halts amplify the spread of small orders, further aggravating short term volatility. Unfor-
tunately, these issues are, thus far, only evaluated on theoretical terms of by experimental markets.
8. Conclusion
Ever since the financial crisis spurred by subprime mortgage debacle, and especially in wake of emerging market crises in 2015
onward, many regulatory bodies on stock markets have implemented circuit breakers to thwart irrational mania of investors by
facilitating a forced cool-off period. The purported rationale is that a calmer market carries less risk and thereby attracts more par-
ticipants by elevating resource re-allocation function of markets. However, these circuit breakers constrict intraday movements by
forcing a move within a bounded interval bracket. Typically, these limits are decided on by governing agencies such as securities and
exchanges commissions by preset volatility percentages against previous trading day’s close price. A survey of prevalent circuit breakers
around the world shows that usually the upper and lower limits of circuit breakers are often symmetric, although recently various
exchanges have imposed market-wide circuit breakers for bearish scenarios only. The uncertainties baked in with extreme volatilities of
stock markets worldwide led to widespread concern for stability from experts. A common understanding is that intraday swings of prices
that are not connected to fundamental aspects of an economic entity hinder the market’s capacity to allocate economic resources
effectively. Furthermore, the recent controversies regarding flash clashes and high-frequency trading’s role in worsening volatilities of
prices in the markets also contribute to the ongoing debate on how to curb the irrational price swings. While it is true that automated
trades minimize trade costs and transaction fees, the lack of human discretion in its trades poses considerable challenges for regulators
intent on preserving themarket health. In this regard, circuit breakers pose an attractive choice to interrupt undesirable trading patterns.
Despite such prospects of utility, due to a mixture of unflattering theoretical and empirical performances, efficacy of circuit breakers
remains hotly contested. More specifically regarding magnet effect, though nearly all theoretical and most of empirical works support
the hypothesis, suggesting that a flaw exists at the design level, the general trend among regulators and exchanges is to embrace them. In
fact, barring emergency discretionary trade suspensions, we found no incidence of an exchange consciously deserting an existing circuit
breaker regime (with the minor exception of the Chinese abandonment in 2016). Juxtaposing the magnet effect studies upon its sister
hypotheses related to circuit breakers (volatility spillover, trading interference, price discovery delay), the regulatory disregard for this
subset of market microstructure research has been somewhat puzzling. However, upon deeper inspection of methodological constraints
and design challenges of such studies, the regulatory incredulity appears more of sympathy. In this paper, we consolidate the theoretical
and empirical literature pertaining to magnet effect hypothesis and highlight the drawbacks of such studies which needs to be redressed
in academia before regulators begin to take its findings more seriously.
Having surveyed nearly a hundred studies relevant to the magnet effect, we are encouraged by several innovative suggestions that
have emerged in recent times. These include multi-tiered circuit breakers, coordinated cross-market circuit breakers, hybrid volatility
interruptions, VPINs, etc. Also, on the theoretical front, it appears that acknowledgement of the circuit breakers’ potential to induce the
magnet effect is driving researchers to pay greater attention to the design of circuit breakers. These efforts underline significant progress
after nearly two decades of incremental fine-tuning of the mechanism by most exchanges. However, these innovative practices are
taking place only in a few highly developed and liquid markets. We anticipate another 5–10 years before the innovations are more
widely implemented globally. The emerging market exchanges stand to suffer the most in this regard, which already grapple with a
combination of ineffective regulation, weaker governance, higher market manipulation, and lax enforcement. Nevertheless, the
encouraging new changes in the realm of circuit breaker practice are sure to motivate a sprawling body of new literature testing its
efficiency. We hope that our suggestions of extending the scope of research in this domain are heeded by researchers so that we have a
well-rounded answer to not merely whether circuit breakers are a good idea but also their ties to other fundamentals connected to
economics and accounting.
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